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Do foreign venture capitalists help the domestic economy, or hamper it by slowing down 
growth, potentially moving economic activity away? This paper addresses this long-standing 
policy question by examining the differential effects of US venture capital investments on the 
growth of Swedish start-up companies. It finds that US venture capital results in more 
employment, not less. These findings continue to hold after controlling for endogenous 
selection effects. US investments are also accompanied by increases in local employment and 
start-up rates. The paper also examines effect on wages, sales, earnings, foreign subsidiaries, 
subsequent funding rounds, and exits. Overall there is no evidence that US venture capital 
investments hamper the domestic growth of Swedish companies. 
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Introduction 
There is a long-standing debate about the advantages and disadvantages of foreign investors. 
Advocates emphasize the benefits of foreign capital, expertise and networks, whereas critics 
worry about hollowing out domestic economic activities. This debate also pertains to the 
financing of start-ups by venture capitalists (VCs). The US is the epicentre of the venture 
capital (VC) industry, and in recent decades US VCs have taken an increased interested in 
global investment opportunities (Aizenman and Kendall, 2012). Policy makers in many 
countries therefore face the question of whether or not to encourage foreign VC investments, 
especially from the US (Bradley et al., 2011). 
Of primary concern to most policy makers is the question of employment creation, which is 
typically the main reason of looking at VC in the first place (Davis et al., 2014; Samila and 
Sorenson, 2011). In addition, there is also an interest in business activity, typically measured 
through sales growth. Finally, there is a concern about exit, especially whether acquirers are 
domestic or foreign. All these policy issues ultimately come down to some factual questions: 
whether foreign VCs have a different impact than domestic VCs? In this paper we set out to 
provide empirical evidence about the differential effects of foreign VC investments. We 
specifically evaluate the main criticism about foreign VCs, that they care less about the 
domestic growth of the companies they invest in. 
To focus our research question, we consider the investments of US VCs in Sweden. We focus 
on US investors, because the US has the largest and most mature VC market and is the most 
powerful source of foreign VC investments. We have several reasons for looking at Sweden. 
First, it is one of the most developed VC markets, always ranked among the top 10 countries 
in terms of VC to GDP ratio (OECD, 2017). We are therefore dealing with an institutional 
environment that is mature and has credible domestic VCs as an alternative to US VCs. Second, 
Sweden has high-quality data, including detailed data on employment and sales of all private 
companies. We are therefore able to measure the effect of US VCs with great precision. Lerner 
and Tåg (2013) provide a detailed description of institutional details of the Swedish VC market. 
It should be mentioned upfront that our analysis only looks at the activities of Swedish start-
up companies in Sweden. Our data sources cannot measure their activities outside of Sweden, 
so we cannot observe employment creation in the US (or elsewhere outside Sweden). We may 
well be underestimating the total growth effect of US VCs on Swedish companies. However, 
our interest here is specifically on the domestic growth of Swedish start-ups, which is the 
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central concern for policy makers, and which our data covers accurately. Note also that our 
data contains one indirect measure of moving activity abroad, namely whether Swedish 
companies establish foreign subsidiaries or not.  
All employment and sales data come from the Swedish Companies Registrations Office. The 
VC data on investments and exits come from Thompson One. Our sample covers the period 
1998 to 2012. The main regression models consider the effect of US VC investments on 
company growth (such as employment and sales) over the subsequent five years. The analysis 
naturally controls for other factors, such as company industry, location, and stage, as well as 
calendar time and economic cycles. We also consider the effect of US VC investments on 
subsequent fundraising and exit. 
Endogeneity is a central concern, as the investments of US VCs should not be treated as 
exogenous. Our analysis combines two well-established instrumental variable approaches. 
First, we consider supply shocks to the VC industry in the US. From the perspective of Sweden 
these are exogenous, as investment opportunities in Sweden are unlikely to drive US VC 
fundraising. Moreover, we control for US and Swedish GDP growth, so as to account for 
relevant macro-economic shocks. This approach is similar to Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). 
Second, we consider local market conditions, using the instrumental variable methods of 
Ackerberg and Botticini (2002). This approach leverages VC supply shocks to local markets, 
defined by industries and local geographies. Our instruments are highly significant in the first-
stage regression that predict the presence of US VCs and pass all the standard specification 
tests. 
Our main results are as follows. We find a strong positive employment effect for companies 
backed by US VCs, both in the simple OLS and in the instrumented 2SLS regressions. The 
effects are economically large and increase over time. We obtain a similar set of results for 
company sales. There is evidence for an increase in profitability and the presence of foreign 
subsidiaries in the long-run. We also find receiving funding from a US VC increases the 
likelihood of raising additional rounds of financing. However, we do not find any statistically 
significant effect of US VC on the probability of exit. Most surprising, we do not find that 
having US VCs increases the likelihood of US exits, such as getting acquired by a US company 
or listing on a US stock exchange. We perform a variety of robustness checks and find that our 
core results are very stable. 
4 
 
This paper adds to the growing literature on the role of VC for economic growth. The work of 
Decker et al. (2014) establishes the importance of young high-growth companies for economy-
wide employment creation. The work of Chemmanur et al. (2011), Puri and Zarutskie (2012), 
and Samila and Sorenson (2011) relate VC financing to economic growth. Our contribution 
here is to ask whether domestic versus foreign VCs have differential growth impacts. This 
provides a link to the literature on cross-border VC investing. Prior work looks at the 
determinants and consequences of foreign VC investments, notable contributions include 
Bottazzi et al. (2016), Chemmanur et al. (2016), Dai et al. (2012), Devigne et al. (2016, 2018), 
Humphery-Jenner and Suchard (2013), and Nahata et al. (2014). Our contribution to this 
literature is two-fold. First, we focus on the aspect of employment creation using census-level 
data, which is the most reliable data source for this purpose. Second, we pay close attention to 
endogeneity and propose a novel set of instruments that has not been used in this context before. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the data, Section 2 
the empirical approach. Section 3 reports the main results from the VC sample, whereas Section 
4 features several extensions and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Data 
1.1 Sources and variable construction 
The data set comprises a panel of all Swedish limited liability companies between 1998 and 
2012. Our focus is on a subset that tracks companies from their first VC investment until exit, 
which we refer to as VC sample. For more on the institutional details of the Swedish VC 
market, see Lerner and Tåg (2013) for a comprehensive description. The data comes from the 
following sources. 
Swedish Companies Registrations Office. Company level data for the period 1998 to 2012 
comes from the Swedish Companies Registrations Office (SCRO). The SCRO is a government 
entity that keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. 
Swedish law requires all limited-liability companies to submit annual accounts to the SCRO1. 
Companies with majority ownership of subsidiaries are required to file information on the 
corporate group structure. Company level data is therefore adjusted to account for subsidiaries, 
when they are present. In addition to accounting information, the SCRO has data on mergers, 
                                                          
1 Årsredovisningslag [1995:1554] 8 sec. 3 and Bokföringslag [1999:1078] 6 sec. 2. 
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bankruptcies, location changes, and industry changes. To ensure the quality of the data, external 
auditors check the filed accounts of all companies. Non-compliance or submitting incorrect 
information results in liquidation and unlimited liability for board members. 
Thompson One. Data on VC investments from Thompson One is matched to the SCRO data 
using company names. Information on exits is collected from M&A data on Thomson One, 
web pages of the VC funds, and mandatory filings to the SCRO (such as liquidations, mergers, 
or bankruptcies). 
Bloomberg. Nasdaq returns, OMX30 returns, Swedish GDP growth, and US GDP growth data 
comes from Bloomberg. 
The full sample contains 3,197,337 company-year observations for 403,794 companies 
between 1998 and 2012. We mainly focus on the subset of companies that receive VC 
investments to study the differential impact of US VC investments. This VC sample consists 
of 4,028 company-year observations for 868 companies. We observe annual data on the number 
of employees, wage costs, sales, profitability (EBIT scaled by average total assets), and 
subsidiaries (domestic and foreign) for each company. To minimise the effect of outliers, we 
winsorize the employment, wage costs, sales, profitability and subsidiary variables at the 95th 
percentile each year. Profitability is also winsorized at the 5th percentile each year. In the VC 
sample, there is a total of 1,143 funding rounds, with an average of 1.3 (76) funding rounds per 
company (year). 10% of rounds (113) include a US VC investor. Exit events are classified as 
exit, alive, or failure. An Exit occurs if the company has an IPO or is acquired.2 Alive means 
that the company is still a portfolio company of VC investors at the end of the sample period. 
A company with a secondary sale is treated as alive if there are further funding rounds after the 
secondary sale. If there are no subsequent funding rounds, the secondary sale is treated as an 
acquisition. A US exit is an IPO in the US or an acquisition by a US acquirer. If the acquirer’s 
location is missing, the acquisition is treated as non-US. US acquisitions should therefore be 
interpreted as ‘known’ US acquisitions. The IPO location is always known. Failure means 
bankruptcy, liquidation, or write-off. If there is no exit information for a company, it is treated 
as a failure. The last observation in the sample is then used as the failure date. The rationale is 
that if there is no information, the company has most likely failed. We include various control 
variables. Company age, industry, location, highest achieved funding round and stage, and 
                                                          
2 The sample contains one reverse takeover. After manual inspection of company filings and press 
reports, this observation is coded as an IPO. 
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lagged employment and sales account for differences in companies. Because one of the 
instruments used in the 2SLS regressions varies at the year level, we use non-overlapping three-
year period fixed effects to control for calendar time. Swedish and US GDP growth and stock 
market returns account for economic cycles. Table 1 reports definitions for all variables used 
in the empirical analysis. 
 
1.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics. In addition to the VC sample we report the statistics for 
two subsamples of interests. One is the sample involving US VC investments (involving 496 
observations, or 12.3% of the VC sample), the other is the sample involving Swedish VC 
investments (involving 2189 observations, or 54.3% of the VC sample). Panel A shows that 
US VCs are associated with more employees, higher managerial pay, higher sales, lower 
profitability, more foreign subsidiaries, and more funding rounds. All these differences are 
highly significant, only the average pay is not statistically different. Panel B shows that US 
VCs have more exits, also more US and foreign exits, but no statistically significant difference 
in failures. On average, companies funded by US VCs are about 2.5 years younger at the time 
of their first VC investment. 
Table 3 reports pairwise correlations for the VC sample. Having a new funding round is 
associated with lower levels of employment, sales, and profitability as well as a lower 
likelihood of having foreign subsidiaries. It is also associated with higher managerial pay, but 
unrelated to average pay. New funding round is also positively correlated with OMX30 returns 
and Swedish as well as US GDP growth. A new funding round with at least one US investor is 
negatively correlated with Nasdaq returns and positively correlated with US GDP growth, but 
neither correlated with OMX30 returns nor with Swedish GDP growth. This seems to suggest 
that new funding rounds, in general, are more likely when the Swedish and US economies are 
doing better, and that funding rounds with US VC participation are correlated with poor US 
stock returns but not Swedish stock returns. 
 
2. Empirical approach  
The empirical analysis uses two panel regression models to study the effect of US VC 
investment on Swedish companies. The following is the base line OLS model specification: 
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𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑈𝑆𝑉𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑍𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖 + 𝜃𝜏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 (1) 
Yi,t+n is the dependent variable for company i in year t+n where n=[1,5]. The dependent variable 
is shifted forward in time to examine whether there are short-term or long-term effects. USVCi,t 
is the variable of interest. It is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a company has a funding round 
with at least one US VC investor in a year. Because the data is a panel, USVC equals 0 if there 
is either no funding round or a funding round without a USVC investor in that year. Xi is a 
vector of company level control variables. Zt is a vector of macroeconomic control variables. 
ζi consists of industry, county, age, round, and stage fixed effects, respectively. 𝜃𝜏 comprises 
non-overlapping three-year period fixed effects (denoted by 𝜏 instead of t). Definitions for all 
variables are reported in Table 1. 
We are interested in the causal effect of US VC investment and note that receiving US VC 
investment is likely endogenous. US VC investors might invest in Sweden when economic 
conditions are favourable. For example, when valuations of Swedish companies are low 
relative to valuations of US companies. In addition, US VC investors might target specific 
companies, for instance, companies in certain industries. Both selection effects can bias the 
coefficient of USVC. To address this formally, we use a 2SLS regression in which USVC is 
instrumented with US VC fundraising in year t-1 and industry-period fixed effects in year t. 
The lagged US VC fundraising instrument captures exogenous capital flows from the US to 
Sweden and is in the spirit of Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). The rationale is that if US VC 
funds have more capital available, they will invest it according to their investment strategies. 
An increase in US VC fundraising should therefore only be related to the future performance 
of Swedish companies through the investment of US VCs. The exclusion restriction is 
reasonable as it is hard to image how an increase in US VC funds would directly impact 
employment in Swedish companies. 
Furthermore, consider a US VC fund which invests in Swedish start-ups. If this fund 
experiences an increase in available capital, it needs to decide which companies to invest in. 
Following Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), we use interaction terms as instruments to capture 
these endogenous choices. This recognizes that the attractiveness of individual companies to 
US VC investors may vary over time and across industries. We call these the Submarkets 
instruments. 
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Table 4 reports the first stage of the 2SLS regressions. We find that our instruments are highly 
relevant. Aggregate USVC is significant at the 1% level, and the Submarkets dummies are 
jointly significant at the 1% level (joint F-test). The coefficient on Aggregate USVC implies 
that an increase in total prior-year US VC fundraising of USD 1 billion increases the probability 
that a Swedish company receives US VC investment by 0.1%. In addition, we note that the F-
statistic from the test for all excluded instruments is well above the conventional threshold of 
10, alleviating concerns about weak instruments. The test of overidentifying restrictions reveals 
that the instruments identify the same set of parameters (Parente and Santos Silva, 2012), and 
hence we are unable to reject the null of all instruments being exogenous (P-value of 0.38) 
conditional on our observable controls (in particular, conditional on joint macroeconomic 
conditions). 
 
3. Main Results from the VC sample 
3.1 Employment and pay results 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that there is a strong positive employment effect in the base line OLS 
model.3 Coefficients for USVC over one- to four-year horizons are all highly statistically 
significant (p-values < 0.01), with effects ranging from 28% to 35% (columns 1 to 4). The 
median number of employees is 13, which implies an increase of 4 to 5 employees. The effect 
becomes marginally insignificant at the five-year horizon. Controlling for endogeneity, the 
effect sizes are significantly larger in the 2SLS model. All coefficients are highly significant 
(p-values < 0.01), and the coefficients are larger. This might be partly due to any remaining 
weaknesses in the instruments, but also suggests that not controlling for endogeneity risks 
understates the effect of USVC on employment. Interestingly, the coefficient of USVC grows 
over in time, implying that USVC investment builds over time. 
Panel B of Table 5 shows a negative average pay effect in the base line OLS model. 
Coefficients on USVC are significant on one- to three-year horizons (p-value < 0.05), with the 
effect becoming weaker over a four-year horizon (p-value < 0.1) and insignificant over a five-
year horizon. This seems to suggest that average pay decreases following USVC investment. 
                                                          
3 For brevity, we refrain from reporting coefficients on all control variables. However, Tables A1 and 
A2 report full regression outputs for an OLS and a 2SLS model, respectively. 
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However, all coefficients on USVC are insignificant in the 2SLS specification. There is no 
effect of USVC on average pay after controlling for endogeneity. 
Panel C of Table 5 suggests that unlike with average pay, there is no effect on managerial pay 
in the OLS model. All coefficients on USVC are insignificant. In the 2SLS model, however, 
there is a positive effect over three- to five-year horizons. It should be noted that the managerial 
pay variable captures total salaries (excluding bonuses) to the board and CEO. The effect of 
USVC on managerial pay could therefore be caused by an increase in salaries to individual 
managers and board members or an increase in the number of managers and board members, 
or a combination of both. For example, it is conceivable that US VC investors strive to replace 
individual board members or the CEO and increase the position’s salary to attract better talent. 
It is also possible that US VC investors increase the board size by demanding representation 
on the board or by bringing in additional outside directors. Unfortunately, we do not observe 
the number of managers and board members and are therefore unable to disentangle these 
effects. 
 
3.2 Sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiaries results 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that there are no significant effects of US VC investments on sales. 
The OLS regressions yield a weak positive effect with a marginally significant coefficient (p-
value < 0.1) over a three-year horizon. However, after instrumentation we find a positive and 
statistically significant effect. Panel B of Table 6 looks at profitability. The OLS model 
suggests a negative short-term effect, however, the 2SLS specification yields a positive long-
term effect. Following US VC investment, there is a significant increase in profitability over a 
three- to five-year horizon. Panel C of Table 6 finds evidence for a positive long-term effect 
on the presence of foreign subsidiaries. In the OLS model, companies are 10% more likely to 
have a foreign subsidiary over a four-year horizon (p-values < 0.1). The 2SLS model reveals 
similar results.4 
 
                                                          
4 Re-running the foreign subsidiary regressions using the natural logarithm of the number of foreign 
subsidiaries (instead of a dummy variable indicating the presence of foreign subsidiaries) yields 
similar results (Table A3). There is a strong positive association in the OLS model and a strong, long-
term effect of USVC on the number of foreign subsidiaries in the long-term. 
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3.3 New funding round, exit, and failure results 
Panel A of Table 7 finds a weak positive effect on new funding round in the OLS model. 
Companies that receive US VC investment are 8-10% more likely to have an additional funding 
round over the next five years. With an unconditional probability of having a new funding 
round of 28.4%, this implies an increase of 31.7%. However, the effect disappears when 
controlling for endogeneity. This seems to suggest that funding rounds cluster in time for 
endogenous reasons. Panel B of Table 7 shows no exit effects. Neither the OLS nor the 2SLS 
regressions yield significant results. Thus, receiving US VC investment does not affect the 
probability of an exit over a five-year horizon. Panel C of Table 7 provides some evidence for 
a negative effect of receiving US VC investment on failure. The OLS model shows that 
companies that receive US VC investment are 3.7% less likely to fail over the next four years. 
This effect is economically large considering the unconditional probability of failure is 0.25%. 
This result holds when controlling for endogeneity in the 2SLS specification, which suggests 
that US VCs do not merely invest in companies that are less likely to fail ex ante. 
Public policy makers are often particularly concerned about foreign exits, i.e., the possibility 
that foreign investors eventually sell the companies to foreign acquirers or list them on foreign 
exchanges. We therefore reran Panel B using only foreign exits as the dependent variable. 
Again, we find no positive significant effects of USVC on the probability of foreign exit (Table 
A4), in fact some of the coefficients are negative and significant. For completeness we also 
reran Panel A using only foreign new investments as the dependent variable and found very 
similar results. 
To summarize, we do not find evidence for the null hypothesis of a negative impact of US VC 
investment on Swedish companies’ performance. In fact, there are positive employment, sales, 
profitability, and foreign subsidiary effects, even after controlling for endogeneity. There is no 
effect on average pay, however, managerial pay increases in the long-term. There is no causal 
impact of US VC investment on exits or new funding rounds. Overall, these findings suggest 
that foreign VC investments benefit domestic companies’ growth. 
 
4. Further results  
4.1 Results from the full sample 
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So far, our analysis compares US VC investments to non-US VC investments conditional on 
the companies receiving some VC investment. There is also an argument to compare 
companies that receive US VC investments against companies not funded by VCs. For this we 
use the full power of the SCRO data which contains all Swedish companies, what we call the 
full sample. We thus examine the impact of receiving investments either from US VCs or  non-
US VCs, against the default case of not receiving any investments from VCs. One limitation 
of this approach is that we can only run OLS regressions. This is because our instruments are 
only valid for receiving US VC investment, but not for non-US VC investment. 
Table 8 reports results from company level OLS regressions. In addition to the usual USVC 
dummy, we now include a non-USVC dummy variable indicating VC investment from non-
US VCs. Again, we find a strong positive association of USVC and employment over a five-
year horizon, with an implied effect size between 34% and 50% (Panel A). Coefficients for 
non-USVC are smaller with an implied effect size between 20% and 22%, and significant only 
over a one- to two-year horizon. The coefficients for sales are again much higher for USVC 
than non-USVC, although the USVC coefficient is only significant for the 2- and 3-year 
horizon, and the non-USVC variable is never significant (Panel B). The coefficients for 
profitability are very similar for USVC and non-USVC, all negative, and many of them 
significant (Panel C). Panel D shows results for foreign subsidiaries. The USVC coefficients 
are invariably higher and more significant. We caution once more that since we cannot control 
for endogeneity, these results should not be interpreted in a causal manner. 
 
4.2 Results for local spill-overs  
The public policy debate about foreign capital is not merely concerned with the effect of foreign 
investments on target companies, but also with their effect on local economic growth. To 
examine such spill-over effects, we consider all other companies operating in the same area 
and industry that do not receive VC investments. For this we can collapse the full sample from 
the company-year to the municipality-industry-year level and calculate dependent and control 
variables using only companies that never receive VC investments during our sample period.  
The USVC variable now captures whether at least one company in a municipality-industry 
received US VC investment in a given year. Similarly, non-USVC now indicates whether 
companies in a municipality-industry received any non-US VC investment in a given year. 
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Table 9 reports the results from OLS regressions.5 A similar picture emerges as in the company 
level regressions. There is a strong positive association of VC with employment (Panel A), 
with effect sizes being roughly twice as large for US VC investment compared to non-USVC. 
In addition, we find a strong positive association with the number of new start-ups (Panel B). 
The effect is roughly two-and-a-half as large for USVC. These results suggest that non-US VC 
investments are associated with stronger local employment growth and entrepreneurship, and 
that the effects are even bigger for USVCs.  
We repeat the local spill-overs analysis in the VC sample. Specifically, we examine the effect 
of at least on company receiving US VC investments on other companies in the same area and 
industry that never receive VC investments during our sample period. The results are similar 
to the ones from the spill-over analysis in the full sample. There is positive, albeit weaker, 
association with employment (Panel C) and a strong positive association with the number of 
new start-ups (Panel D). 
Overall, these results suggest a positive relationship between VC investments and other 
companies that operate in the same geography and industry, most notably other companies’ 
employment and the number of new start-ups. Again, we note that in the absence of an 
instrument, we cannot not infer causality here.  
 
4.3 Further robustness 
In addition to the various robustness tests already mentioned, we now address several 
additional robustness checks. 
First, we ask whether there are differences between US and other foreign investors. In the 
appendix we report results from regressions that distinguish three types of foreign investors: 
US VCs, Nordic VCs, and rest-of-world (ROW) VCs. We re-run all VC sample regressions 
and only report OLS regression as the instruments are not suitable for the additional types of 
foreign investors (Tables A5 – A8). The inclusion of these other foreign VCs does not have a 
material effect on the US VC coefficients. The effect of Nordic and ROW VCs on employment 
is weaker. Many of their coefficients are in fact insignificant, although there are a few 
                                                          
5 The regression specification is analogous to the company level regressions with the exception that the 
control variable ‘age at first round’ and fixed effects other than period fixed effects could not be 
included. 
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interesting findings. ROW VCs are associated with more sales, Nordic VCs with more foreign 
subsidiaries, more new funding rounds, and a lower likelihood of failure. 
 
Our main specification compares US VC investments against a default of observations where 
companies either received no investments, or investments from non-US VCs. As a robustness 
we consider narrowing down our sample to the round level, so that the default is only 
observations where companies received investments from non-US VCs. The advantage of such 
a round-to-round sample is a sharper comparison of the impact of receiving VC investments 
with and without US VC investors. The disadvantage is a reduction of the sample size by almost 
75%, potentially weakening the statistical significance of the results. Again, our instruments 
are highly relevant, and we fail to reject the null of all instruments being exogenous (Table 
A9). Similarly, the F-statistic from the test for excluded instruments is well above the 
conventional threshold of 10 and alleviates any weak instrument concerns. Results for the 
company level regressions using the VC sample hold with significance and effect sizes of 
similar magnitude (Tables A10 – A12). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper provides empirical evidence to a long-standing policy debate about whether foreign 
investors benefit the local economy. We specially look at the role of US VC investors in 
Swedish start-up companies. We find that US VC investments result in higher employment, 
both at the company level and the level of the local economy. The empirical model controls for 
endogenous selection using well-established instrumental variable approaches. Overall the 
evidence rejects the notion that US VCs stunt the domestic growth of Swedish start-ups. 
Our paper invites several avenues for further research. We are only able to measure the 
domestic growth of companies, so an interesting outstanding question is whether there are 
systematic differences in their non-domestic growth. A natural conjecture is that US VC 
investments would lead to growth in the US activities of the investment companies. Finding 
reliable data for tracking this remains a challenge for future research. Another interesting 
question for future research concerns the quality of the jobs created by domestic versus foreign 
VCs. Finally, there is a question about the broader impact of US VCs on the development of 
the domestic VC market. The theoretical work of Hellmann and Thiele (2018) suggests that 
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foreign VCs can play a catalytic role in the development of a domestic VC market and 
entrepreneurial ecosystem. Future work might examine this hypothesis empirically. 
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Table 1  
Variable definitions  
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Variable Description 
Employment The natural logarithm of one plus the number of employees of a 
company in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is 
winsorized at the 95% percentile. Data comes from the Swedish 
Companies Registrations Office (SCRO) which keeps track of all 
limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. 
Average pay Total wage costs divided by the number of employees of a company 
in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is 
winsorized at the 5% and 95% percentiles. Data comes from the 
SCRO which keeps track of all limited liability companies in 
Sweden, both public and private. 
Managerial pay The natural logarithm of board and CEO salary of a company in a 
given year. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at 
the 95% percentile. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps track of 
all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. 
Sales The natural logarithm of one plus sales of a company in a given year. 
To limit the effect of outliers the variable is winsorized at the 95% 
percentile. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps track of all 
limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. 
Profitability EBIT scaled by the average of beginning- and end-of-period total 
assets of a company in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the 
variable is winsorized at the 5% and 95% percentiles. Data comes 
from the SCRO which keeps track of all limited liability companies 
in Sweden, both public and private. 
Foreign subsidiaries A dummy variable that equals one if a company has foreign 
subsidiaries in a given year. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps 
track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and 
private. 
New funding round A dummy variable that equals one if a company has a funding round 
in a given year. Data comes from the SCRO which keeps track of all 
limited liability companies in Sweden, both public and private. 
Exit A dummy variable that equals one if a company has an exit (IPO or 
acquisition) in a given year. Data comes from M&A data on Thomson 
One, web pages of the VC funds, and mandatory filings to the SCRO 
(such as liquidations, mergers, or bankruptcies). 
Failure A dummy variable that equals one if a company fails. Failure means 
bankruptcy, liquidation, or write-off. If there is no exit information 
for a company, it is treated as a failure. Data comes from M&A data 
on Thomson One, web pages of the VC funds, and mandatory filings 
to the SCRO (such as liquidations, mergers, or bankruptcies). 
New start-ups The natural logarithm of one plus the number of new start-ups in a 
municipality in a given year. To limit the effect of outliers the 
variable is winsorized at the 95% percentile. Data comes from the 
SCRO which keeps track of all limited liability companies in 
Sweden, both public and private. 
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Panel B: Independent variables 
Variable Description 
USVC A dummy variable that indicates whether a company receives US VC 
investment in a given year. It equals one in years in which a company 
has a funding round with at least one US VC investor. It equals zero 
in years without a funding round, and in years with a funding round 
without a US VC investor. 
Non-USVC A dummy variable that indicates whether a company receives non-
US VC investment in a given year. It equals one in years in which a 
company has a funding round without a US VC investor. It equals 
zero in years without a funding round, and in years with a funding 
round with at least one US VC investor. 
Instruments 
 
Aggregate USVC Total VC fundraising in the US in the previous year (used to 
instrument for USVC in the 2SLS regressions). Data comes from 
Thompson One. 
Submarkets Period-industry fixed effects (used to instrument for USVC in the 
2SLS regressions). Period fixed effects are non-overlapping three-
year period fixed effects. 
  
Panel C: Control variables 
Variable Description 
Firm level  
Age at first round The natural logarithm of the age of the company at the time of the 
first financing round. To limit the effect of outliers the variable is 
winsorized at the 95% percentile. Data comes from the SCRO which 
keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both public 
and private. 
Macroeconomic  
OMX30 Annual return of the OMX30 index. Data comes from Bloomberg. 
Nasdaq Annual return of the Nasdaq index. Data comes from Bloomberg. 
Swedish GDP 
growth 
Annual real GDP growth in Sweden. Data comes from Bloomberg. 
US GDP growth Annual real GDP growth in the US. Data comes from Bloomberg. 
Fixed effects  
Industry Dummy variables that indicate the industry a company operates in. 
There are 6 industries in our sample. Data comes from the SCRO 
which keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both 
public and private. 
County Dummy variables that indicate the county a company is located in. 
There are 21 counties in our sample. Data comes from the SCRO 
which keeps track of all limited liability companies in Sweden, both 
public and private. 
Age Dummy variables that indicate how many years have passed since the 
first funding round. Data on investment rounds comes from 
Thompson One. 
Round Dummy variables that indicate the highest achieved funding round. 
Data on investment rounds comes from Thompson One. 
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Stage Dummy variables that indicate the highest achieved stage. Data on 
investment rounds comes from Thompson One. 
Period Dummy variables for non-overlapping three-year periods. 
This table reports variable definitions. Panels A, B, and C report descriptions for dependent, 
independent, and control variables, respectively. 
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Table 2      
Descriptive statistics    
Panel A: Company-year level    
  Total mean USVC=1 Only SWE Diff T stat 
Employees 14.655 19.349 13.565 5.784*** (11.192) 
Average pay 508759 505149 511842 -6693 (-0.406) 
Managerial pay [million] 0.732 0.868 0.702 0.166*** (7.133) 
Sales [million] 25.850 31.213 24.892 6.320*** (4.468) 
Profitability -0.127 -0.174 -0.118 -0.056*** (-5.035) 
Foreign subsidiaries 0.283 0.391 0.239 0.152*** (6.408) 
New funding round 0.284 0.389 0.294 0.095*** (3.977) 
      
Observations 4,028 496 2,189 2,685   
      
Panel B: Company level    
  Total mean USVC=1 Only SWE Diff T stat 
Exit 0.259 0.333 0.228 0.105* (1.939) 
US exit 0.035 0.092 0.016 0.076** (2.408) 
Foreign exit 0.106 0.172 0.083 0.090** (2.110) 
Failure 0.012 0.023 0.012 0.011 (0.663) 
Age at first round 8.893 6.448 9.904 -3.456*** (-3.548) 
      
Observations 868 87 508 595   
This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A reports these at the company-year level and Panel B at 
the company level. In Panel A, Only SWE and USVC=1 refer to companies that have only Swedish VC 
investors and companies that have at least one US VC investor in any funding round, respectively. In 
Panel B, Only SWE and USVC=1 refer to companies that have only Swedish VC investors in all funding 
rounds and companies that have at least one US VC investor in any funding round, respectively. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 3              
Correlations             
  
USVC Employment 
Average 
pay 
Managerial 
pay 
Sales Profitability 
Foreign 
subsidiaries 
New 
funding 
round 
Age at 
first 
round 
OMX30 Nasdaq 
Swedish 
GDP 
growth 
US 
GDP 
growth 
USVC 1             
Employment 0.08*** 1            
Average pay -0.05*** -0.03 1           
Managerial 
pay 
0.04** 0.30*** 0.07*** 1          
Sales -0.02 0.57*** 0.02 0.13*** 1         
Profitability -0.10*** 0.22*** -0.16*** 0.00 0.35*** 1        
Foreign 
subsidiaries 
0.05*** 0.42*** -0.06*** 0.12*** 0.31*** 0.16*** 1       
New funding 
round 
0.27*** -0.03* 0.00 0.04** -0.11*** -0.22*** -0.05*** 1      
Age at first 
round 
-0.03** 0.36*** -0.10*** 0.07*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.20*** 0.03 1     
OMX30 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.05*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.04** 1    
Nasdaq -0.05*** -0.03* 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04*** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.87*** 1   
Swedish 
GDP growth 
0.02 0.03 -0.04** -0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.02 0.12*** 0.04** -0.02 -0.11*** 1  
US GDP 
growth 
0.04** 0.07*** -0.07*** 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 0.04*** 0.19*** 0.05*** 0.08*** -0.05*** 0.91*** 1 
This table reports correlations. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4  
2SLS: First stage 
  USVC 
Aggregate USVC 0.001*** 
 (3.316) 
Submarkets Yes 
Controls  Yes 
Observations 4,028 
Adj. R 0.08 
IV F-stat 252.62 
Only Sub markets F-stat 257.98 
Test of overidentifying restrictions P-val 0.38 
This table reports the results of the first stage of the company level 2SLS regressions using the VC 
sample. USVC, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a US VC investor, is instrumented with the 
variables listed in Panel B of Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as 
well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 5      
VC sample: Employment and pay regressions  
Panel A: Employment    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.300*** 0.284*** 0.352*** 0.321** 0.206 
 (2.928) (2.678) (3.017) (2.411) (1.281) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.63 0.52 0.43 0.37 0.32 
USVC (2SLS) 2.443*** 2.107*** 2.293*** 2.913*** 3.017*** 
 (4.570) (3.361) (3.529) (3.827) (3.170) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.55 0.46 0.36 0.24 0.16 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: Average pay    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) -85,151** -89,550** -116,456** -80,994* -71,717 
 (-2.161) (-2.022) (-2.355) (-1.725) (-1.480) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
USVC (2SLS) -7,370 -163,894 -300,364 -351,207 -61,232 
 (-0.040) (-0.820) (-1.247) (-1.245) (-0.304) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.09 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,493 2,896 2,382 1,938 1,549 
      
Panel C: Managerial pay    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.408 0.232 -0.264 0.506 0.223 
 (0.815) (0.390) (-0.406) (0.675) (0.257) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.2 0.18 
USVC (2SLS) 3.529 4.258 7.324** 9.603** 7.596* 
 (1.136) (1.211) (2.091) (2.526) (1.832) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.13 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report employment, average pay, and managerial pay regressions, respectively. The dependent variable 
is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS and 
2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of 
Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and 
sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6      
VC sample: Sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiaries regressions 
Panel A: Sales     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.565 0.877 1.211* 0.475 0.068 
 (1.075) (1.493) (1.957) (0.669) (0.072) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.52 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.27 
USVC (2SLS) 7.738** 6.785* 10.317*** 11.939*** 12.966*** 
 (2.336) (1.729) (2.869) (2.892) (2.665) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.48 0.4 0.29 0.2 0.13 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: Profitability     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) -0.042** -0.014 0.012 0.001 0.001 
 (-2.117) (-0.721) (0.458) (0.053) (0.022) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.11 
USVC (2SLS) 0.028 0.164 0.318** 0.246 0.447*** 
 (0.217) (1.270) (2.226) (1.634) (2.976) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.08 -0.03 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,024 3,403 2,848 2,354 1,908 
      
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.08 0.075 0.088 0.102* 0.08 
 (1.511) (1.369) (1.468) (1.696) (1.146) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.2 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.18 
USVC (2SLS) 0.486 0.426 0.302 0.546* 0.455 
 (1.357) (1.076) (0.702) (1.963) (1.600) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.15 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiary regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS and 
2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of 
Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and 
sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 7      
VC sample: New funding round, exit, and failure regressions 
Panel A: New funding round    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.077* 0.061 0.098** 0.092* 0.091* 
 (1.689) (1.389) (2.189) (1.681) (1.656) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.1 0.1 
USVC (2SLS) -0.294 -0.168 -0.261 0.136 -0.084 
 (-1.361) (-0.771) (-1.139) (0.546) (-0.370) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.1 0.08 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: Exit     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.03 -0.023 -0.004 0.034 -0.008 
 (1.155) (-1.262) (-0.169) (1.009) (-0.259) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
USVC (2SLS) 0.142 0.09 -0.223 0.007 -0.054 
 (1.175) (0.760) (-1.627) (0.054) (-0.301) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.01 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel C: Failure     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) -0.011 0.011 -0.006 -0.037*** -0.005 
 (-0.713) (0.494) (-0.398) (-4.367) (-0.297) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
USVC (2SLS) 0.021 0.009 -0.153* -0.256** -0.088 
 (0.197) (0.091) (-1.823) (-2.111) (-0.976) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report new funding round, exit, and failure regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS 
and 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in 
Panel B of Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged 
employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 8      
Full sample: Company level regressions   
Panel A: Employment     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.503*** 0.458*** 0.470*** 0.444*** 0.339** 
 (4.515) (3.832) (3.452) (3.050) (1.962) 
Non-USVC 0.219*** 0.200*** 0.12 0.112 0.084 
 (4.617) (3.218) (1.603) (1.450) (1.057) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.75 0.68 0.62 0.57 0.52 
Observations 3,197,337 2,797,972 2,431,286 2,093,973 1,788,386 
      
Panel B: Sales     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.905 1.210* 1.513** 1.081 0.708 
 (1.525) (1.700) (1.963) (1.350) (0.698) 
Non-USVC 0.193 0.176 0.253 0.56 0.178 
 (0.719) (0.520) (0.639) (1.349) (0.415) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.49 0.4 0.33 0.28 0.24 
Observations 3,197,337 2,797,972 2,431,286 2,093,973 1,788,386 
      
Panel C: Profitability     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC -0.125*** -0.098*** -0.041 -0.02 -0.051* 
 (-5.529) (-4.352) (-1.462) (-0.668) (-1.757) 
Non-USVC -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.047*** -0.016 -0.055*** 
 (-6.129) (-5.391) (-2.951) (-0.946) (-3.120) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Observations 3,183,511 2,790,040 2,424,560 2,087,911 1,783,029 
      
Panel D: Foreign subsidiaries    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.167*** 0.148*** 0.139** 0.127** 0.096 
 (2.887) (2.616) (2.199) (2.017) (1.345) 
Non-USVC 0.068** 0.062** 0.04 0.026 0.01 
 (2.344) (2.111) (1.246) (0.793) (0.281) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Observations 3,197,337 2,797,972 2,431,286 2,093,973 1,788,386 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the full sample. Panels A, B, C, and 
D report employment, sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiary regressions, respectively. The 
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dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest 
is USVC, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a US VC investor. In addition, we 
include non-USVC, which indicates a funding round without US VC investment. We include all 
control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for 
all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 9      
Municipality-industry level regressions  
Panel A: Employment in full sample   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.069*** 0.097*** 0.127*** 0.150*** 0.168*** 
 (6.267) (6.055) (6.214) (6.095) (5.716) 
Non-USVC 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.064*** 0.081*** 0.094*** 
 (3.872) (3.304) (3.439) (3.756) (3.794) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.9 0.88 
Observations 22,721 20,828 18,961 17,113 15,295 
      
Panel B: New start-ups in full sample   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.802*** 0.790*** 0.785*** 0.782*** 0.789*** 
 (9.072) (8.375) (8.212) (7.755) (7.780) 
Non-USVC 0.288*** 0.280*** 0.275*** 0.271*** 0.274*** 
 (5.149) (4.826) (4.615) (4.414) (4.302) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.51 
Observations 22,721 20,828 18,961 17,113 15,295 
      
Panel C: Employment in VC sample   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.022* 0.034* 0.041 0.047 0.062 
 1.751 1.712 1.589 1.41 1.431 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 
Observations 546 504 462 420 378 
      
Panel D: New start-ups in VC sample   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.366** 0.380** 0.397** 0.414** 0.424** 
 2.299 2.327 2.392 2.489 2.476 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.64 
Observations 546 504 462 420 378 
This table reports the results of municipality-industry level regressions. Panels A and B report 
employment and new start-up regressions in the full sample, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variables of interest are USVC (dummy 
variable indicating the presence of a US VC investor) and non-USVC (dummy variable indicating a 
funding round without US VC investors). Panels C and D report employment and new start-up 
regressions in the VC sample, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC. In all specifications, we 
include the macroeconomic and period fixed effects control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well 
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as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1     
VC sample: Full output for OLS employment regression 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.300*** 0.284*** 0.352*** 0.321** 0.206 
 (2.928) (2.678) (3.017) (2.411) (1.281) 
Lagged employment 0.749*** 0.688*** 0.620*** 0.542*** 0.458*** 
 (29.692) (21.677) (15.192) (10.961) (7.655) 
Lagged sales 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.013 
 (0.857) (0.632) (0.460) (0.964) (1.271) 
Age at first round 0.036 0.070** 0.101** 0.125** 0.162*** 
 (1.646) (2.263) (2.523) (2.492) (2.745) 
OMX30 0.212* 0.149 0.123 -0.177 -0.439 
 (1.824) (0.445) (0.380) (-0.501) (-0.991) 
Nasdaq -0.197* -0.058 -0.047 0.202 0.402 
 (-1.854) (-0.218) (-0.182) (0.737) (1.110) 
Swedish GDP growth 2.290* 2.651 2.585 2.122 -2.119 
 (1.769) (1.135) (1.122) (0.849) (-0.502) 
US GDP growth -3.149 -3.401 -2.617 -4.588 -9.730* 
 (-1.270) (-1.122) (-0.834) (-1.157) (-1.913) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R 0.63 0.52 0.43 0.37 0.32 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the full OLS employment regression output of company level regressions using the 
VC sample. The dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The 
variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. 
We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and sales. 
Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A2     
VC sample: Full 2nd stage for 2SLS employment regression 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 2.513*** 2.137*** 2.237*** 3.095*** 3.556*** 
 (4.700) (3.327) (3.400) (3.880) (3.097) 
Lagged employment 0.730*** 0.667*** 0.602*** 0.526*** 0.440*** 
 (27.863) (19.767) (14.192) (10.172) (6.910) 
Lagged sales 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.011 0.016 
 (1.552) (1.200) (0.826) (1.254) (1.477) 
Age at first round 0.053** 0.090*** 0.123*** 0.151*** 0.202*** 
 (2.259) (2.809) (2.972) (2.903) (3.164) 
OMX30 0.144 -0.23 -0.272 -0.711 -0.232 
 (1.026) (-0.573) (-0.671) (-1.489) (-0.319) 
Nasdaq -0.101 0.251 0.269 0.653* 0.234 
 (-0.760) (0.777) (0.828) (1.679) (0.371) 
Swedish GDP growth 1.201 -0.144 -0.152 -1.674 4.474 
 (0.839) (-0.055) (-0.058) (-0.549) (0.586) 
US GDP growth -1.026 -0.069 0.563 -0.795 0.396 
 (-0.368) (-0.021) (0.163) (-0.172) (0.053) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Round FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Stage FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Adj. R 0.54 0.46 0.36 0.22 0.08 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the full 2SLS second stage employment regression output of company level 
regressions using the VC sample. The dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 
5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence 
of a USVC investor. USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of Table 1. We include 
all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions 
for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A3     
VC sample: Foreign subsidiaries (log)   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.145*** 0.120** 0.114** 0.155*** 0.087 
 (2.761) (2.356) (2.151) (3.093) (1.516) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 
USVC (2SLS) 0.354 0.1 -0.156 0.765*** 0.661* 
 (0.889) (0.257) (-0.423) (2.652) (1.871) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.19 0.18 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions for the log of the number of foreign 
subsidiaries using the VC sample. The dependent variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 
5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence 
of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS and 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS 
regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of Table 1. We include all 
control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for 
all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A4     
VC sample: New US funding round and US exit regressions 
Panel A: New US funding round   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.109*** 0.069*** 0.067** 0.087** 0.087*** 
 (3.156) (2.912) (2.347) (2.540) (2.843) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
USVC (2SLS) 0.054 0.005 -0.084 -0.059 0.061 
 (0.507) (0.050) (-0.641) (-0.864) (0.944) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: US exit     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.017 -0.010*** 0.024 -0.015*** -0.007 
 (1.116) (-2.763) (1.194) (-3.193) (-0.465) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
USVC (2SLS) 0.009 0.019 -0.008 -0.059 -0.054 
 (0.145) (0.468) (-0.190) (-0.764) (-0.500) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A and B 
report new US funding round and US exit regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is shifted 
forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS and 2SLS 
regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of 
Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment 
and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A5     
VC sample: Employment and pay regressions  
Panel A: Employment    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.241** 0.230** 0.321*** 0.299** 0.198 
 (2.269) (2.119) (2.732) (2.269) (1.235) 
Nordic VC 0.149*** 0.129* 0.04 0.082 0.181 
 (2.935) (1.725) (0.367) (0.713) (1.464) 
ROW VC 0.218*** 0.190** 0.144 0.103 -0.013 
 (3.220) (2.450) (1.511) (0.965) (-0.102) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.63 0.52 0.43 0.37 0.32 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: Average pay    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC -87,510** -89,516** -113,894** -81,137* -70,511 
 (-2.152) (-1.965) (-2.252) (-1.703) (-1.433) 
Nordic VC 3,360 7,772 -14,438 25,564 17,449 
 (0.105) (0.240) (-0.400) (0.643) (0.394) 
ROW VC 11,075 -6,268 -5,261 -9,215 -14,308 
 (0.323) (-0.175) (-0.134) (-0.223) (-0.313) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
Observations 3,493 2,896 2,382 1,938 1,549 
      
Panel C: Managerial pay    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.337 0.126 -0.33 0.453 0.222 
 (0.671) (0.210) (-0.504) (0.601) (0.252) 
Nordic VC -0.174 0.279 0.028 0.442 0.7 
 (-0.429) (0.662) (0.053) (0.729) (0.970) 
ROW VC 0.523 0.356 0.341 0.162 -0.235 
 (1.331) (0.787) (0.647) (0.270) (-0.323) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.2 0.18 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report employment, average pay, and managerial pay regressions, respectively. The dependent 
variable is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, 
which is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. In addition, we include 
Nordic VC and ROW VC, which are dummy variables indicating the presence of Nordic and ROW 
VC investors, respectively. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as 
lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A6     
VC sample: Sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiaries regressions 
Panel A: Sales     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.368 0.683 1.028* 0.4 0.000 
 (0.704) (1.153) (1.676) (0.569) (0.000) 
Nordic VC 0.154 -0.134 -0.13 0.065 -0.156 
 (0.425) (-0.326) (-0.236) (0.114) (-0.238) 
ROW VC 0.981*** 1.081*** 1.076*** 0.449 0.446 
 (3.014) (2.862) (2.590) (0.760) (0.568) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.52 0.43 0.35 0.31 0.27 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: Profitability     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC -0.031 -0.006 0.02 0.000 -0.002 
 (-1.537) (-0.309) (0.760) (0.014) (-0.086) 
Nordic VC -0.035* -0.03 -0.052** 0.006 -0.024 
 (-1.897) (-1.464) (-2.552) (0.253) (-1.082) 
ROW VC -0.034** -0.021 -0.011 0.005 0.024 
 (-2.176) (-1.139) (-0.527) (0.200) (1.042) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.12 0.11 
Observations 4,024 3,403 2,848 2,354 1,908 
      
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.055 0.052 0.062 0.088 0.067 
 (1.018) (0.919) (1.011) (1.405) (0.945) 
Nordic VC 0.089* 0.094* 0.101* 0.070 0.048 
 (1.932) (1.858) (1.829) (1.232) (0.805) 
ROW VC 0.073 0.056 0.077 0.064 0.057 
 (1.491) (1.109) (1.435) (1.125) (0.929) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.21 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.18 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiary regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. In addition, we include Nordic VC and 
ROW VC, which are dummy variables indicating the presence of Nordic and ROW VC investors, 
respectively. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged 
employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
35 
 
Table A7     
VC sample: New funding round, exit, and failure regressions 
Panel A: New funding round    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.049 0.035 0.088* 0.09 0.088 
 (1.002) (0.725) (1.892) (1.613) (1.557) 
Nordic VC 0.145*** 0.123*** 0.033 0.017 0.054* 
 (4.171) (3.735) (1.070) (0.570) (1.790) 
ROW VC 0.052 0.055 0.033 0.003 -0.004 
 (1.472) (1.486) (0.860) (0.093) (-0.141) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.1 0.1 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel B: Exit     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.031 -0.034* -0.017 0.027 -0.01 
 (1.203) (-1.817) (-0.615) (0.826) (-0.326) 
Nordic VC -0.008 0.018 0.019 -0.007 0.01 
 (-0.463) (0.936) (0.931) (-0.333) (0.446) 
ROW VC 0.005 0.046** 0.055** 0.044 0.009 
 (0.297) (1.992) (2.096) (1.526) (0.342) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
      
Panel C: Failure     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC -0.006 0.016 -0.003 -0.039*** -0.001 
 (-0.368) (0.761) (-0.200) (-4.142) (-0.043) 
Nordic VC -0.013 -0.037*** 0.004 0.026 -0.019 
 (-1.185) (-4.379) (0.249) (1.294) (-1.235) 
ROW VC -0.019 -0.004 -0.020* 0.003 -0.021* 
 (-1.529) (-0.246) (-1.930) (0.146) (-1.898) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Observations 4,028 3,405 2,849 2,355 1,908 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report new funding round, exit, and failure regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. In addition, we include Nordic VC and 
ROW VC, which are dummy variables indicating the presence of Nordic and ROW VC investors, 
respectively. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged 
employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A8     
VC sample: Municipality-industry level regressions 
Panel A: Employment    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.021 0.027 0.03 0.039 0.06 
 (1.075) (0.969) (0.910) (0.969) (1.127) 
Nordic VC 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.01 
 (0.143) (0.118) (0.073) (-0.026) (-0.152) 
ROW VC 0.000 0.015 0.028 0.028 0.021 
 (0.003) (0.612) (0.885) (0.786) (0.528) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 
Observations 546 504 462 420 378 
      
Panel D: New start-ups    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC 0.289 0.314 0.337* 0.351* 0.353* 
 (1.629) (1.670) (1.761) (1.828) (1.811) 
Nordic VC 0.23 0.23 0.219 0.199 0.211 
 (1.064) (1.038) (0.967) (0.853) (0.912) 
ROW VC -0.076 -0.101 -0.098 -0.058 -0.048 
 (-0.412) (-0.542) (-0.524) (-0.308) (-0.249) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 
Observations 546 504 462 420 378 
This table reports the results of municipality-industry level regressions using the VC sample. Panels A 
and B report employment and new start-up regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is shifted 
forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. In addition, we include Nordic VC and ROW VC, 
which are dummy variables indicating the presence of Nordic and ROW VC investors, respectively. We 
include the macroeconomic and period fixed effects control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well 
as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
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Table A9 
2SLS: First stage 
  USVC 
Aggregate USVC 0.002*** 
 (3.253) 
Submarkets Yes 
Controls  Yes 
Observations 1,140 
Adj. R 0.09 
IV F-stat 22.73 
Only Sub markets F-stat 24.05 
Test of overidentifying restrictions P-val 0.39 
This table reports the results of the first stage of the company level 2SLS regressions using the R2R 
sample. USVC, a dummy variable indicating the presence of a US VC investor, is instrumented with the 
variables listed in Panel B of Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as 
well as lagged employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A10     
R2R sample: Employment and pay regressions  
Panel A: Employment    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.198** 0.211* 0.319*** 0.303** 0.157 
 (2.017) (1.959) (2.604) (2.213) (0.955) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.52 0.35 0.25 0.23 0.19 
USVC (2SLS) 0.906** 0.692 1.149** 1.386** 2.111** 
 (2.150) (1.426) (1.988) (2.261) (2.134) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.48 0.33 0.2 0.15 -0.03 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
      
Panel B: Average pay    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) -94,508** -110,729** -137,925*** -95,081** -86,416* 
 (-2.376) (-2.384) (-2.695) (-2.001) (-1.695) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 
USVC (2SLS) -143,182 -242,501* -520,036*** -486,924** -285,345 
 (-1.061) (-1.655) (-2.669) (-2.564) (-1.328) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.05 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.03 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,073 930 793 684 581 
      
Panel C: Managerial pay    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.022 -0.251 -0.521 0.351 0.006 
 (0.041) (-0.400) (-0.755) (0.445) (0.007) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.2 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.08 
USVC (2SLS) 1.892 2.354 2.821 2.619 -1.288 
 (0.787) (0.918) (0.932) (0.831) (-0.323) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.19 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.08 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the R2R sample. Panels A, B, and C 
report employment, average pay, and managerial pay regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS and 
2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in Panel B of 
Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged employment and 
sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A11     
R2R sample: Sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiaries regressions 
Panel A: Sales     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.234 0.464 0.886 0.167 -0.309 
 (0.440) (0.807) (1.455) (0.231) (-0.333) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.44 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.18 
USVC (2SLS) 6.255** 2.708 4.044 5.601* 7.074 
 (2.243) (0.963) (1.310) (1.704) (1.536) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.34 0.31 0.21 0.1 0.06 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
      
Panel B: Profitability     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) -0.014 0.02 0.03 0.000 0.007 
 (-0.636) (0.946) (1.055) (0.004) (0.234) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.15 
USVC (2SLS) 0.086 0.093 0.198 0.164 0.280* 
 (0.939) (0.914) (1.529) (1.247) (1.949) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.04 0.01 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,138 1,014 897 799 701 
      
Panel C: Foreign subsidiaries   
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.077 0.083 0.101 0.127* 0.109 
 (1.397) (1.414) (1.576) (1.932) (1.462) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.1 
USVC (2SLS) 0.432* 0.496** 0.517** 0.577** 0.657* 
 (1.960) (2.124) (1.991) (2.291) (1.874) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.1 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.03 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the R2R sample. Panels A, B, and 
C report sales, profitability, and foreign subsidiary regressions, respectively. The dependent variable 
is shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is 
a dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS 
and 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in 
Panel B of Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged 
employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A12     
R2R sample: New funding round, exit, and failure regressions 
Panel A: New funding round    
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.01 0.008 0.075 0.082 0.087 
 (0.224) (0.172) (1.607) (1.428) (1.567) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.21 0.11 0.13 0.08 0.09 
USVC (2SLS) -0.414** -0.184 -0.112 0.069 -0.256 
 (-2.308) (-0.894) (-0.516) (0.376) (-1.131) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.08 -0.03 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
      
Panel B: Exit     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) 0.04 -0.027 -0.009 0.025 -0.021 
 (1.478) (-1.448) (-0.314) (0.661) (-0.659) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
USVC (2SLS) 0.114 0.068 -0.119 -0.049 0.087 
 (1.078) (0.514) (-1.081) (-0.315) (0.499) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
      
Panel C: Failure     
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
USVC (OLS) -0.001 0.022 -0.011 -0.043*** 0.001 
 (-0.050) (0.976) (-0.758) (-3.375) (0.075) 
Adj. R (OLS) 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 
USVC (2SLS) 0.033 0.084 -0.034 -0.066 -0.044 
 (0.461) (0.878) (-0.478) (-0.735) (-0.591) 
Adj. R (2SLS) 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.01 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,140 1,016 898 800 701 
This table reports the results of company level regressions using the R2R sample. Panels A, B, and 
C report new funding round, exit, and failure regressions, respectively. The dependent variable is 
shifted forward in time in columns 1 to 5, respectively. The variable of interest is USVC, which is a 
dummy variable indicating the presence of a USVC investor. Each panel reports results from OLS 
and 2SLS regressions. In the 2SLS regressions USVC is instrumented with the variables listed in 
Panel B of Table 1. We include all control variables listed in Panel C of Table 1 as well as lagged 
employment and sales. Definitions for all variables are reported in Table 1. T statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
